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# The American Catholic Sociological Review

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THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION

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**American Catholic Sociological Society**

CHICAGO TOWERS

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Chicago, Illinois  
September 7th, 1940

My dear Father Gallagher:

I appreciate the opportunity you afford me to say that I am deeply interested in the American Catholic Sociological Society and have followed its work from its very beginning.

In no field of thought today are the truths of the Gospel more disregarded and even condemned than in sociology. A determined effort is being made to interpret life in social work in the light of miasmic secularism and its interpretation becomes for many a norm for social legislation and welfare practice. We need Catholic sociologists to defend in social work Catholic teaching and to construct sound social welfare on Catholic teaching. It is necessary that we avail ourselves of all the authentic findings of modern scholars and add to them if we are going to be true to our Apostolate and seek to win to Christ society about us. Your Society must be a powerful force to stimulate Catholic students of social questions to understand the important place they have in the Apostolate of Holy Church and protect souls and society against the venom of humanistic thinking which excludes Christ from the realities of life.

I wish your Society great success and bless its officers and members.

Sincerely yours in Christ,

Archbishop of Chicago

Rev. Ralph A. Gallagher, S.J.  
Loyola University  
Chicago, Ill.

## De Bonald and De Maistre

GEORGE F. FITZGIBBON

Even a cursory examination of histories of social thought and sociological theory reveals that scant consideration has been accorded the contributions of Catholic thinkers;<sup>1</sup> and, curiously enough, in the works of Catholic writers similar superficial treatment — or a complete disregard — of highly significant social thought of Catholics throughout the centuries is apparent. It is true that in a great number of monographs written by Catholic<sup>2</sup> and non-Catholic<sup>3</sup> scholars, certain aspects of the sociological theories of many prominent Catholics have been presented — almost invariably as incidental to an exposition of their philosophical, political, economic or ethical views; but there is a deplorable absence of systematic sociological analyses and critiques.

There is a vast and fertile field of Catholic sociological thought which awaits intensive cultivation. This fact has often been emphasized by Professor Sorokin, probably the most eminent sociologist

<sup>1</sup> E. g. J. P. Lichtenberger: *Development of Social Theory*, New York, 1923; F. N. House: *The Range of Social Theory*, New York, 1929; *The Development of Sociology*, New York, 1936; C. E. Ellwood: *A History of Social Philosophy*, New York, 1938; T. Abel: *Systematic Sociology in Germany*, New York, 1929; H. E. Barnes and H. Becker: *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, Boston, 1938, 2 Vols.; E. S. Bogardus: *The Development of Social Thought*, New York, 1940; W. G. Beach: *The Growth of Social Thought*, New York, 1939. Contrasting significantly with these is P. A. Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, New York, 1928.

<sup>2</sup> E. g. Bede Jarrett: *Social Theories of the Middle Ages*, Boston, 1926; W. Schwer: *Catholic Social Theory*, St. Louis, 1939; S. Deploige (C. C. Miltner trans.): *The Conflict Between Ethics and Sociology*, St. Louis, 1938; E. Cahill: *The Framework of a Christian State*, Dublin, 1932.

<sup>3</sup> E. g. C. H. McIlwain: *The Growth of Political Thought in the West*, New York, 1932; W. A. Dunning: *A History of Political Theories* (3 Vols., New York, Vol. I, 1902; Vol. II, 1905; Vol. III, 1920. H. J. Laski: *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, New Haven, 1917; *Authority in the Modern State*, New Haven, 1919; E. Whittaker: *A History of Economic Ideas*, New York, 1940; E. Troeltsch: *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, 3rd ed., Tübingen, 1923. R. W. and A. J. Carlyle: *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, New York, 1903-1916, Vols. I and III; T. J. C. Hearnshaw: *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers in the Age of Reason*, London, 1930.

now living. In his critical review of psycho-sociological theories concerning the rôle of religion in the dynamics of social phenomena, Sorokin states that "in their non-transcendental parts" theories such as those of St. Augustine, De Bonald and De Maistre

"often contain the most valuable scientific observations, statements and hypotheses. For instance, J. de Maistre's *Considérations sur la France*, and *Les soirées de Saint-Petersbourg* or de Bonald's *Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux dans la société civile* . . . contain in their 'empirical' parts more sociology than a dozen sociological textbooks taken together. In those parts such works are naturally within the competence of sociologists, and should be studied by them."<sup>4</sup>

A similar statement might well be made with equal validity regarding the works of the Patristic writers as a group, the Schoolmen — particularly St. Thomas Aquinas, Bossuet, Le Play, Krose, Dawson ("the Catholic Spengler"), and those of many other distinguished Catholic thinkers who, with the exception of Le Play, are little known for their contributions to sociological theory.<sup>5</sup>

Louis Gabriel Ambrose de Bonald (1754-1840) and Joseph de Maistre (1754-1821)<sup>6</sup> occupy positions of prime significance in the history of social thought. In their basic beliefs and intellectual perspectives, as well as in their sociological conclusions, there is a remarkably close resemblance between the two men. However, in background, temperament, and approach to the study of social phenomena, they differed strikingly.

The lives of de Bonald and de Maistre spanned the most tempestuous phases of a vastly significant revolutionary period in the Western world. De Maistre, a social thinker whose work constituted the

<sup>4</sup> *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, New York, 1928; p. 661. It should not be inferred from this statement that Sorokin considers the non-empirical "transcendental" parts of these works to be lacking validity or to be unimportant; he is not concerned with these matters. He merely means that they lie outside the province of "logico-experimental" science.

<sup>5</sup> The writer is not concerned here with Catholics like Pope Leo XIII, von Ketteler, Manning, and others, who have dealt primarily with social problems, and have made important contributions to applied sociology and social ethics; nor with such writers as Bellarmine, Suarez, Mariana, and Vitoria, whose social thought lies largely within the restricted field of political theory.

<sup>6</sup> A monograph on the sociological theories of de Bonald and de Maistre is being prepared for publication by the writer of this article; only a few observations will be presented in this paper to demonstrate, briefly, their importance.

spearhead of the intellectual attack upon the dominant ideologies of his day, was a Savoyard nobleman, forced into exile in 1797 when the armed forces of the French Republic swept over Italy. During the period of social convulsion from 1803 to 1817 he held the position of Sardinian ambassador to the Czar, remote from the most violent social disorders. These facts are of importance in that they explain, at least in large measure, de Maistre's ability to view objectively the sweeping social dynamics of the revolutionary period, to discern and evaluate the forces which engender radical social change, to grasp the significant implications of this Revolution, and to present a penetrating analysis of the phenomenon of revolution, its causes and effects. De Maistre's study of revolutionary and catastrophic social change<sup>7</sup> ranks with the remarkable analyses of revolution made by Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, and Sorokin.

Strongly emphasizing order and stability in social relationships and institutions, and fearing anarchy — he could observe distressing evidence of the disruption of formerly stable social conditions and human relationships all about him — de Maistre, more than any other European thinker, led the assault of the "traditionalists" upon the individualistic, secularistic, égalitarian and anti-monarchical ideas which were becoming firmly entrenched and were destined to be so fruitful in social unrest and exaggerated individualism as time went on. He hated the Revolution and its ideals, not simply for personal reasons, nor upon religious or political grounds alone — although all these were factors; his caustic attack upon the prevalent ideologies, especially the materialistic concept of "progress," and those of "liberty" and "equality," and his scorn for the "Philosophers" who expounded them bears, in its essentials, a striking resemblance to Pareto's treatment of non-logical "derivations."<sup>8</sup>

A widely accepted belief among Social Darwinians (until 1914 and after) was that as men have become more "humanitarian," and as general education has advanced, the cruder forms of struggle between human beings — war in particular — have diminished, and have tended steadily to be replaced by more refined forms of oppo-

<sup>7</sup> *Considérations sur la France; Théorie des révoltes par l'auteur de l'esprit de l'histoire*, Neuchâtel, 1797; later editions, Paris, 1817; and Lyons, 1924; also in Vol. I of *Oeuvres complètes*; 14 Vols.; (new ed. Lyons, 1884-86).

<sup>8</sup> See V. Pareto: *Traité de sociologie générale*, Paris, 1917; especially Vol. I, pp. 1-64.

sition. Some of the more enthusiastic of these social evolutionists went so far as to assert that war and other forms of conflict on the physical level were soon to disappear from civilized societies.<sup>9</sup>

However, exhaustive researches conducted by Sorokin and others regarding fluctuations in the movement of war, and the data of the present century, reveal clearly that for the large countries of Europe war has by no means decreased, and that there is no indication that militarism has been decreasing through the centuries: the curve of war fluctuates without any regular trend in either direction.<sup>10</sup> As early as 1797 de Maistre had clearly seen the fallacy of the evolutionary hypothesis concerning war, and he came to the conclusion that

"la guerre est l'état habituel du genre humain dans un certain sens; c'est à dire, que le sang humain doit couler sans interruption sur le globe, ici où là; et que la paix, pour chaque nation, n'est qu'un répit."<sup>11</sup>

Differing from those who have maintained that war has a deleterious effect upon the development of the arts and sciences, de Maistre declared that war and struggle have been highly significant in social advancement, and he cited a number of historical illustrations to support his contention.<sup>12</sup> Although he is careful to point out the fact that neither de Maistre's extreme view nor the opposite theory expresses a universal truth, Sorokin makes the significant observation:

"If the theory of de Maistre were quite wrong the facts indicated by him could not have taken place. However, they happened; and more than that, the correlation between the war periods and the extraordinary number of the great men of genius born in such a period, or immediately after it, seems to exist, and is tangible in a much larger number of cases than those which are mentioned by de Maistre. Furthermore, we have seen that nations have been spending more time in war than in peace. If the influence of war were deleterious as depicted by its critics, an intellectual progress could not possibly have taken place; but this happened."<sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup> For example, M. Vaccaro: *Les bases sociologiques*, Paris, 1898; J. Novicow: *Les luttes entre sociétés humaines et leur phases successives*, Paris, 1896; and G. Tarde: *Les lois sociales*, Paris, 1898.

<sup>10</sup> P. A. Sorokin: *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, New York, 1937; Vol. III, Parts 2 and 3. See also F. A. Woods: *Is War Diminishing?* Boston, 1915; G. Bodart: *Losses of Life in Modern Wars*, Oxford, 1916; S. R. Steinmetz: *Die Philosophie des Krieges*, Leipzig, 1907.

<sup>11</sup> *Considérations sur la France*; in *Oeuvres*; Lyons, 1884-1886; pp. 28 ff.

<sup>12</sup> *Oeuvres*; Vol. I, pp. 36-37.

<sup>13</sup> *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, New York, 1928; p. 351. See also his *Social Mobility*, New York, 1927; Chaps. 21-22.

The sociologism of de Maistre — an approach to the consideration of social phenomena which did not conflict in the least with his fervent Catholicity<sup>14</sup> — receives its most forceful expression in his repudiation of atomistic theories and mechanistic interpretations of human behavior and social processes.<sup>15</sup> His emphatic adherence to the conception of society as a reality "sui generis," logically and factually anterior to the individual, is essentially a restatement of a sociological position which had been held, long before, by Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and others, and was to appear later in the theories of such thinkers as Saint-Simon, Comte, and — in an extreme form — in the social realism of Durkheim.

De Maistre had nothing but contempt for contractual theories of society; his organic interpretation is basically in line with the conceptions of de Bonald, Burke, and others,<sup>16</sup> whose theories exemplified a revival of social organicism, and a striking reaction, in the latter part of the eighteenth, and early in the nineteenth, century, against theories of the artificial nature of society, so prominent in the thought of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.<sup>17</sup>

De Maistre's social thought, and particularly his political theory, is closely interwoven with his religious beliefs: the very existence of society must be explained, in the last analysis, in terms of a decree of God; the monarchic principle has prevailed in both Church and State during the Christian era; infallibility is an attribute of the Pope, just as sovereignty is an attribute of the legitimate secular ruler. The Pope, as God's representative on earth, is an "absolute" sovereign in the true sense of the word, and should enjoy entire freedom from conciliar control; the Protestant Revolt was just one aspect of the same fundamental error which brought on the French Revolution.<sup>18</sup>

De Maistre witnessed the rise and spread of ideologies which he believed were destined to undermine order and authority in society:

<sup>14</sup> P. R. Rohden: *Joseph de Maistre als politischer Theoretiker; Forschungen zur mittelalterlichen und neueren Geschichte*; Vol. II, Munich, 1929.

<sup>15</sup> Especially in his *Considérations sur la France*, and his *Essai sur le principe générateur des constitutions politiques*. (Paris, 1814; new ed. Lyons, 1924.)

<sup>16</sup> E. g. Herder, Lessing, Fichte, Kant and Hegel.

<sup>17</sup> However, it is important to note that in some respects — notably in his emphasis on "order" and "obedience" if stable social relationships were to prevail, and in his conclusions based upon this, de Maistre's views bear a rather close resemblance to those of Hobbes. See de Maistre: *Les soirées de Saint-Petersbourg*, Paris, 1821; 2 Vols.; *Du Pape*, Lyons, 1819; 2 Vols.

<sup>18</sup> *Du Pape: Essai sur le principe générateur*.

he desired social reconstruction based upon Catholic principles and upon a recognition of social and psychological<sup>19</sup> realities. He maintained that the foundations of social constitutions exist prior to all written laws: to argue that society is created by the act of human wills, and to believe that a body of written formulas is the actual constitution of a people, are to ignore eternal verities. No people, asserts de Maistre, can give itself liberty by establishing a Declaration of Rights. A free society may draw up a constitution emphasizing freedom, but a constitution emphasizing freedom can never make a people free. Freedom must exist in the institutions and the "moeurs" of the people. Their true constitution is merely the expression of ideas, beliefs, and practices which have become crystallized in the social structure.<sup>20</sup>

Here we find an early recognition of the binding power of the folkways and mores, grossly exaggerated later by Sumner<sup>21</sup> and distorted by him into an assumed basis of ethical principles. De Maistre never adopted a view even remotely resembling Sumner's relativism. Viewed superficially, de Maistre's conception might be interpreted as an undue emphasis upon psycho-social factors; however, like Montesquieu,<sup>22</sup> he recognized that the social and political organization of a society are correlated with, and influenced by, such factors as the composition of the population, economic elements, religious beliefs and practices, customs, and geographical factors.<sup>23</sup>

"He (de Maistre) found a new dogma — the sovereignty of the people — popularized by the Revolution. No item in the term was defined, no implications had been studied. The magic of a phrase had enthralled the intelligence of men. There was easy talk of the rights of men and, once more, no shadow of precision in the talk. Society, he pointed out, was not born, as Rousseau devoutly urged, from deliberation; for that term itself implies the organization which is society. Nor can we predicate a society before we have a sovereign, in order that we may refer authority to a popular origin. The very idea of human intercourse implies, to his mind, the idea of sovereignty;

<sup>19</sup> De Maistre vigorously criticized the prevalent excessive confidence in the powers of human reason.

<sup>20</sup> *Essai sur le principe génératuer* (entire); *Considérations sur la France*; Chaps. 6 and 7. Contrast with J. Locke: *Two Treatises of Government* (H. Morley, ed., 2nd ed., London, 1887.)

<sup>21</sup> W. G. Sumner: *Folkways*; Boston, 1906.

<sup>22</sup> C. L. Baron de Montesquieu: *De l'Esprit des Lois*, Paris, 1871; English trans.: *Spirit of the Laws*, new ed.; revised, London, 1878; 2 Vols.

<sup>23</sup> *Considérations sur la France*; Chap. 6.

'for the term "people" suggests an organization built round a common center, and without sovereignty there can be neither union nor political unity.' He is equally opposed to the suggestion that man is in any sense an independent being. He admits that the thought is an easy one but is founded upon a mistaken interpretation of freedom. We have to accustom ourselves to grasp firmly the idea of a divine will as the foundation of human society, and only in so far as man acts in harmony with that will is he capable of constructive achievement. . . . To conceive of man as an isolation is to build a State upon the basis of his separatism. But that is to neglect the fact that the State is essentially an unity, over and above its constituent parts. The attempt to base it upon separatism results in an undue stress of the individual on the one hand, and of reason on the other."<sup>24</sup>

Unlike de Maistre, de Bonald was a native Frenchman, born at Aveyron in 1754. He was a member of a distinguished old provincial family, many of his ancestors having served with distinction in the armies and parliaments of France. An ardent adherent of the old monarchy, de Bonald was compelled to migrate during the French Revolution. He settled in Heidelberg, where he wrote extensively. Returning to France in 1806, he gained the favor of Napoleon, and in 1808 he was appointed to the position of Minister of Instruction. From 1815 until 1822 he served in the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Peers. In 1822 he was made Minister of State, and presided over the censorship commissions. Raised to the peerage by Louis XVIII, he retired, under the next dynasty, to Monna, where he died on November 23, 1840.

During his sojourn as an emigré at Heidelberg, de Bonald wrote the first of his penetrating critiques of the Revolution and the philosophy underlying it;<sup>25</sup> and for more than thirty years he steadily elaborated his thesis against revolution in a series of works which have been little studied, but are, nevertheless, of great sociological importance.<sup>26</sup> His analyses of social convulsion, its etiology and

<sup>24</sup> H. J. Laski: *Studies in the Problems of Sovereignty*, New Haven, 1917; pp. 214-215. See Chap. V (pp. 211-238) for a critique of de Maistre's theories by Laski, who opposes his views.

<sup>25</sup> *Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux dans la société civile démontrée par le raisonnement et l'histoire*; 3 Vols., Constance, 1796. (*Oeuvres*; Vol. V, Paris 1817)

<sup>26</sup> *Oeuvres*; 11 Vols., second ed., Paris 1817: *Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de l'ordre social; ou du pouvoir, du ministre et du sujet dans la société*; *Oeuvres*, Vol. I; *Legislation primitive considérée . . . par les seules lumières de la raison*; *Oeuvres*; Vols. II, III, IV; *Du divorce considéré au*

consequences, are more purely intellectual and logical than the more emotional attacks presented with greater eloquence by Burke.

Fundamentally a rather pedantic optimist, de Bonald lacked the pessimism, the intellectual brilliance, and the vivid literary style of de Maistre; and these considerations are undoubtedly significant reasons why his works have been much less widely known.

Throughout his writings de Bonald's points of view are based upon Catholic philosophy. He repeatedly indicts the theories of the Revolution, not only because they are unsocial but also because they are atheistic. Society is

"la reunion des êtres semblables pour la fin de leur reproduction et de leur conservation;"<sup>27</sup>

and the essence of that union is

"... le rapport du pouvoir et du ministre pour le bien et l'avantage des sujets."<sup>28</sup>

Here we may observe a trilogistic conception which permeates all de Bonald's work. In this instance it is his formula which sums up the nature of the family (which, with true sociological insight, he recognizes as the unit cell of society), of the Church, and of the state; a sovereign power to will, a ministry to execute the will of the sovereign power, and subjects to obey and to derive benefit from the combination of sovereign power and its ministers.<sup>29</sup> This arrangement, de Bonald believed, constitutes the universal rule of nature, an orderly system of relationships which has been violated by the Protestant Revolt, by the doctrines of the Revolution, and — in the family — by divorce.<sup>30</sup>

Like de Maistre, de Bonald adhered to an organic theory of society and repudiated the social contract hypothesis. In fact, a major part of his sociological thought is based upon a series of analogies between the individual body, the family, and the social group as

*XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle; Oeuvres; Vol. II; Recherches philosophiques sur les premiers objets de connaissances morales; Paris, 1818; Mélanges littéraires et politiques, démonstration philosophique du principe constitutif de la société; Paris, 1819.* The latest collected edition of de Bonald's works is that of Migne, Paris, 1859.

<sup>27</sup> *Oeuvres; Vol. II, p. 133.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> This view opposes Montesquieu's theory of the division of powers.

<sup>30</sup> *Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de l'ordre social; Oeuvres; Vol. I; Du divorce; ibid, Vol. II.*

a whole. This often results in a confusing of categories; specifically, the biological, the psychological, and the social, a defect which is characteristic of organismic theories.

In defense of his anti-atomistic concepts de Bonald developed several types of argument which have been important in later sociological thought. In particular, his philological argument, in which he stresses the importance of language, points out that language is not an individual invention, and emphasizes its social transmission, indicates his moderate sociologicistic position clearly.

De Bonald's classification of family types represents an attempt to accomplish that which was undertaken later with more success, by Le Play. He saw, however, the strength of the rural family, and he felt that the urban environment is too productive of social change to be anything but dangerous to social order and stability.

For the student of sociological theory de Bonald merits independent study. He is no mere shadow of de Maistre, for he built a far wider basis of sociological theory for his political and ethical generalizations than did his better-known friend. De Maistre, in fact, apparently recognized this, for in a letter to de Bonald he wrote:

"Je n'ai rien pensé que vous ne l'avez écrit; je n'ai rien écrit que vous ne l'avez pensé."

• • •

## Requisites for Graduate Study in Social Work

ELIZABETH E. LLOYD

Progress in education demands that schools examine and evaluate curricula often since changes in content of courses occur constantly. The professional curricula of Schools of Social Work especially have been so affected by social change in the past twenty-five years that all efforts have been directed toward meeting the changes in and pressures of a rapidly developing profession. With recognition and acceptance of the fact that the field of social services required professional training at the graduate level, the need for closer integration of the professional and undergraduate curricula was evident. Experience has shown that students enter the Schools of Social Work with a wide range in background for professional study. Too early specialization with a preponderance of courses in sociology or a general classical course with little induction to the social sciences represent the extremes. Undergraduate schools have been required to meet not only the normal changes in course content but also the problem of coordinating their work with the not always clearly defined objectives of Schools of Social Work. What, in general, are the Schools of Social Work attempting to do, and what do they believe are requirements for graduate study in social work?

The Schools of Social Work are preparing students to assume serious and new responsibilities in public welfare service and private enterprise. The social worker is concerned with the adjustment of the individual and with his social environment. The aim of the school, then, must be to adequately train students to understand and be able to use methods which will improve social conditions for individuals and the social environment of individuals. A generic basic preparation is needed in the social work methods courses and related courses which have social significance. Knowledge is imparted to the student which will enable him to participate in social welfare planning; to understand social legislation. For the student whose focus of interest may be the administration of public and private welfare activities or social research, the generic course content serves as basic preparation for specialization later.

The methods courses usually refer to the technical courses in social case work, group work and community organization. Other courses considered as fundamental to student training are public welfare which includes knowledge of public assistance, organization and administration; child welfare which is also a methods course; social statistics, and social research, medical information, psychiatric information and legal information which has social implications. Supervised field work is concurrent to and closely correlated with theory in order that the student may have experience in the application of social work theory to practice. The Schools of Social Work do not recommend specialization in the first year, since the basic courses are essential to any social work setting.

The social work student in graduate study is concerned with the individual who has failed to make an adjustment. He is concerned with methods of meeting the problems of unsatisfactory social conditions. As background he should understand normal behavior, intelligence and what constitutes personal and social adjustment. He should know the causes for social conditions as they exist. The principles of economic, political and social organization is material with which the Schools of Social Work must assume the student is familiar. Lack of these basic courses have created problems for the Schools of Social Work.

Dr. Hathway, the Executive Secretary of the American Association of Schools of Social Work, has observed that "overspecialization in the undergraduate years frequently brings to the School students who have concentrated in sociology to the exclusion of other social sciences. . . . The Schools of Social Work have found it necessary to develop special courses such as the 'economic basis of insecurity' in order to acquaint students with the relationship of economic change to social work changes."<sup>1</sup>

The student must be able to express himself in writing. Often in the evaluation of research and thesis material much effort is expended in the correction of English composition.

In addition to academic background, there are certain personal qualifications which are necessary for the student in graduate work. As expressed by one school, "sound health, emotional balance, mental maturity, high moral purpose, adequate habits of study and gen-

<sup>1</sup> Training for Public Welfare and Social Work: I. From the Viewpoint of the American Association of Schools of Social Work. — Marion Hathway. Reprint from *Social Forces* 18: October 1, 1939.

uine interest in people are the indispensable equipment of every prospective social worker."<sup>2</sup> It is not to be overlooked that many students come from the protective influence of stable home and Catholic educational environment. They are often unprepared to meet the serious problematic situations with which they must deal. Theory which is contrary to sound principle confronts them and they are unprepared because there is rejection but not knowledge of the weaknesses of the theory. The result is that the student becomes insecure and inarticulate in the group. There should be no conflict. Social work in its development has had contact with theory which is not sound, but social workers with a Catholic educational background have a definite contribution to make and must not be unsure.

Personal qualities which are essential for social work may be recognized and the undergraduate student guided to interest in courses which will prepare him for graduate study in social work. With too early specialization in the undergraduate schools students who may be particularly well equipped with the personal qualifications for social work have gone into other fields.

It is accepted that in addition to the general cultural course which includes ethics, philosophy, history, English, literature and composition, there are subjects of economics, political science, psychology and sociology required for graduate study in social work. It is also accepted that the undergraduate schools should not give courses in social work. Many of the thirty-eight Schools of Social Work have made requirements in terms of credit hours in the social sciences; for example, the requirements of 20 hours with 4 semester hours in economics, 2 in political science, 4 in psychology, 10 in sociology, or more credits in economics and political science. The American Association of Social Workers state that for membership the applicant must have 20 semester hours of social and biological science, "any courses in sociology, economics, political sciences, psychology and psychiatry, anthropology, and biology may be submitted as social and biological sciences."

The Curriculum Committee of the American Association of Schools of Social Work in a report of a study of prerequisites for admission to Schools of Social Work indicated that the three social sciences, economics, political science and sociology and psychology are related to social welfare administration by providing the tools for diagnosis and treatment, the principles which guide in the for-

<sup>2</sup> Fordham University School of Social Work *Bulletin*, 1940-1941.

mulation of policies and some methods for measurement of the effect of social service problems. The Curriculum Committee on the basis of the study recommended, May 25, 1937, "that economics, political science, psychology and sociology (including anthropology) be recognized as the preprofessional subjects most closely related to the Social Service Curriculum."<sup>3</sup>

To summarize, the Schools of Social Work have been required to develop curricula to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding program of public welfare. The students preparing for graduate study require adequate and more knowledge of the basic principles of economics and political science. The increased emphasis on the value of social research and experts in social research in relation to social work agencies requires a good background in the sociological courses. For better understanding of the problems of the individual and his behavior, the student should have more courses in psychology. For all students, not particularly students in Schools of Social Work, a good practical foundation in philosophy, ethics, and the social sciences which will prepare him for the problems which he must meet in life today, provide him with the security of sound thinking and knowledge of "principles which determine social service policies." Socialization of not only the individual who receives assistance through the efforts of social welfare agencies and programs but socialization also of those who support them should be the aim of the educator as well as the social worker.

<sup>3</sup> Pre-requisites for Admission to Schools of Social Work: Reprint from the *Social Service Review* 11; 1937, 471.

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## The Nature of Economic Science and Its Relation to Social Philosophy

THOMAS F. DIVINE

Paraphrasing a statement of Buckle one might say that the practical significance of a science lies on its periphery, that is in that twilight zone where it impinges upon other sciences. The subject of the present paper is such a peripheral study. It is concerned with the nature of economic science and its relationships with some of its kindred social sciences, particularly of social philosophy. This twofold nature of our present topic brings the writer face to face with a twofold difficulty. The first is that he is concerned with elucidating the nature of a science which even in these days of alleged enlightenment and educational progress is as much maligned as it is little understood. The second is that his subject lies on the borderlands of economics, regions which, to use the happy phrase of Professor Robbins, "are the happy-hunting grounds of minds averse to the effort of exact thought." (Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2 ed., p. 83.)

For the misunderstanding of which this infant among the sciences has been a long-suffering victim, economists themselves cannot be held entirely free from censure. Certain incautious statements and poorly worded phrases, certain unnecessary and deprecable acerbities in professional controversy, have furnished material which their enemies were not slow to seize upon, to generalize and to use against economists as a class. But the greater blame must be laid at the door of the perpetrators of these attacks, many of whom have launched or propagandized widely accepted economic fallacies without reading in their entirety the works of the men they criticize, with no specialized training in economic science, and with no more expert knowledge of the working of the economic system than is to be gleaned from second-hand, popularized and generally misleading sources.

While still in its swaddling clothes economic science was dubbed by such opprobrious epithets as "the dismal science," "pig-philosophy," a mere parrot-like repetition of demand and supply. And now that it has grown into manhood it hears even its very existence im-

pugned on the grounds that economists cannot even agree among themselves, and that economic science has failed either to explain the working of the economic system or to afford methods and practicable advice by which the system can be improved. To the popular mind, all too innocent of the methods and achievements of economic analysis, this may seem very amusing; and very impressive. To the trained economist it will also seem amusing — tragically amusing. But not very impressive. Should he think it economically profitable to sacrifice the time that might be devoted to more positive and fruitful occupation he might firmly but politely reply that economics, far from being a dismal science, is a most indispensable science, shedding light to which one cannot afford to blind himself on the problems of social reform and social ameliorization; that it is a science and not a philosophy, and that no more than any other science is it concerned with pigs as pigs; that far from remaining content with a parrot-like repetition of the formula "demand and supply" economic science is concerned par excellence with analyzing and elucidating the forces which lie behind the operation of demand and supply, forces of which no one who undertakes to operate upon the pricing system can dare to be ignorant; that among serious-minded and trained economic scientists the area of agreement is far greater than the area of dispute, that indeed the area of dispute in economics is no greater than that in any of the natural sciences; and that the very examples chosen to illustrate the inability of economics to prescribe for cases of economic and social pathology, prove that the fault lies not with the economists but with those who attempt to prescribe for the ills of society by methods against the implications of which the neglected and despised economists have signalled frantic warnings. But to what avail the reply if the charges are made not in the interest of truth, but to sharpen a battle-ax for political or even less worthy purposes. *Nemo invitus persuadetur.*

"It seems to be a fairly common belief," observes Professor Batson, "that economics can be understood, and even taught, without first being learned." (Practical Economics, p. 9.) In addition to the ordinary handicaps that impede the development of any science, this is one of the special difficulties that economics has had to face. The reason for this may lie in the fact that the terminology of economics consists for the most part of words taken from everyday usage. The common man who does not realize that these terms are used in a very limited and technical sense, and that for the scientific

use of the technique or apparatus of economic analysis a very special training is required, may lose his respect for the supposed "scientist" who deals with such concepts as "wealth," "utility," "scarcity," "value," "production," "exchange" etc., and put away from him a scientific treatise on economics with the feeling that, thanks to an occasional nickel or dime deposited at the pamphlet rack and to a faithful conning of the daily or weekly press, he is just as well qualified as the author to discourse on such subjects. This danger is not so great in the physical sciences, guarded as they are against lay and amateurish intrusion by a specialized terminology and scientific technique. To borrow an illustration from Professor Pigou, not even the most self-confident of politicians would dare to push past the dragon of the calculus of tensors which guards the gates of theoretical physics. (*Economics in Practice*, p. 7.) Yet if the economist does attempt to construct a more formal technique by the use of terms unintelligible to the untrained reader or even has recourse to what Marshall calls a little "potted calculus" for a more precise formulation of his conclusions, he is accused of intentional and vicious obscurantism.

Another special difficulty which confronts the theoretical economist is that any flight into the higher realms of pure theory is likely to draw from his critics the sharp rebuke that he is wasting his time in mere academic theorizing, barren Scholasticism, fruitless metaphysical speculation. The eminent English biologist, Professor A. V. Hill, relates that after delivering a lecture in Philadelphia on the Mechanism of the Muscle he was challenged by an indignant auditor to show of what use his investigations had been to the science of physiology. "To tell you the truth," the Professor replied, "we don't do it because it is useful, but because it is amusing." (Quoted from Hill's *Muscular Movement in Man*, in Pigou, *loc. cit.*, p. 3.) Now, however legitimate the pursuit of truth for its own sake, the economist cannot afford to rest content with this objective. He must have one eye set upon the practical benefits which his investigations are likely to confer upon mankind. Yet this does not mean that the economist should concern himself merely with the solution of immediate practical problems. For to attempt to cure the ills of any part of the system, one must have a thorough knowledge of the complex actions and interactions of the system as a whole. Physiology is the basis of pathology. And any investigation which throws additional light on the normal functioning of the economic system must lead to a better understanding of the evils which arise from the presence of abnormal conditions.

Economics as a coordinated and systematically developed science is of comparatively recent birth. In the days of the Grecian and of the Medieval Scholastic philosophers economic speculation was confined to occasional sallies into the field of pure theory with a view to seeking guidance in the solution of some ethical problem of a definitely economic character, e. g., the just price or the morality of interest. Even in the 16th and 17th centuries the theorizing of the Mercantilists was confined to the solution of practical problems of the day. It was not until the 18th century that the first attempts were made to construct a systematic theory of economics which explained the operation of the economic system as a whole. The two founders of this new science were the brilliant Ferdinando Galiani, an Italian Abbé, wit, savant, member of the Italian diplomatic corps in France and founder of the French Utility School — and Richard Cantillon in England. Though the Classical School preserved and developed the methodology inaugurated by these two founders, their departure from Galiani's superior theory of value prevented their system from presenting a unified and systematically coordinated whole based upon a single theory of value. This achievement is to be credited to the Marginal Utility School of 1870 and after.

Etymologically "economy" means the regulating or managing of a household. It describes a branch of activity which is concerned with the administration of household affairs or resources. (For an excellent illustration of economic activity as afforded by the administration of household resources cf. Wicksteed: *The Common Sense of Political Economy*, especially the first four chapters.) In current usage economy means the administration of any sort of resource in such a way as to obtain maximum returns, i. e., administration with a minimum of waste. Hence "economical" expresses a characteristic of administrative activity. Adding the current to the etymological significance the concept of economy acquires the meaning of: "the administration of the affairs and resources of a household in such a manner as to avoid waste and secure efficiency." (Wicksteed, loc. cit., Vol. I, p. 14.) In like manner political economy would signify the administration by a central authority of the resources of the state, considered as an extended household or community; and the study of political economy would be the study of "the principles on which the resources of the community should be so regulated and administered as to secure the communal ends without waste." "Political Economy" was actually the term given to this science until recent

years. But in view of the fact that in modern economic life the decisions made by the central government authority with respect to the administration of resources are comparatively few, while under a system of free enterprise such as is still found in varying degrees in most of the countries of the world today by far the greater part of economic decisions are made by individual consumers and producers, the old term has yielded to one of broader significance, viz., simply "economics" or economic science.

Economics we shall define as: "the science which deals with human conduct in its administration of scarce means for the attainment of alternative ends or purposes." (Cf. Robbins loc. cit., Ch. 1.) This definition enjoys the advantage of going to the very heart of the nature of economic conduct, the necessity of choice between different possible alternative uses of scarce means or economic goods. Unlike most other definitions, it does not circumscribe the subject-matter of economics to any particular kinds of conduct (such as that concerned with the creation of material wealth, or social behavior in an exchange economy), but focuses attention upon a certain *aspect* of behavior. All conduct is economic (whether concerned with things material or immaterial) which involves a sacrifice of other desirable alternatives. An examination of our definition discloses the necessity of the presence of four conditions for conduct to be economic (i. e., to have an economic aspect). On the subjective side: 1) there must be a multiplicity of wants (i. e., of ends) to be satisfied (this marks the difference between an economic and a technological problem); and 2) these ends or wants must be capable of arrangement in an order of importance, i. e., the economic subject must be capable of choosing between them, applying the means or economic resources to the attainment first of the more important and then of the less important until his resources are exhausted. On the objective side: 1) the means or economic goods capable of satisfying those ends or wants must be scarce relatively to their satisfaction; and 2) they must be capable of being put to alternative uses. Here it is appropriate to note that the term "end" in economics differs from "end" in the philosophical sense. Economics is concerned not with final but with proximate ends, i. e., of immediate objectives of conduct. Immediate ends are in fact ascribable to some more ultimate end, e. g., health, or happiness, or the glory of God. But the economist is not concerned with these; merely with the fact that a particular means or economic good satisfies some want and is therefore desired.

Here we might proceed to the consideration of economics as a positive science and of its relation to social philosophy (i. e., ethics or moral philosophy as applied to social problems). But for a better understanding of the nature of economic science let us first investigate the methods of analysis it invokes. In the first place, economics utilizes in its attempt to explain the operation of the complex economic system the logical or deductive method, i. e., the process of reasoning from the general to the particular, of drawing more specific conclusions from general assumptions or premises. Hence economic analysis is, in the words of Professor Fetter, "the elucidation of the implications of the necessity of choice in various assumed circumstances." (*Principles of Economics*, pp. ix and 12-21.) The conclusions or principles of economic theory are deductions from a series of main and subsidiary postulates. The most fundamental assumption underlying the entire development of economic theory is that of "rational" conduct in a very technical sense, i. e., of conscious and purposeful choice of the most efficient methods of utilizing or administering economic resources for the maximum satisfaction of wants (sometimes called the economic motive which, however, should not be identified with purely selfish interests). In addition to this, the main assumptions of the theory of valuation and exchange are the existence of individual scales of preference, i. e., that individuals are capable of arranging their wants in an order of relative importance, and the existence of diminishing marginal utility of economic goods or means in satisfying the ends or wants on the preference scales. The additional main assumption of the theory of production is a fact of a technical character, i. e., the existence of the law of diminishing returns (which implies that factors of production are relatively indivisible and not perfectly substitutable for each other). Starting from these assumptions (which are the result of actual observation of human conduct and of technical conditions of economic life) and other broad postulates of the nature of simplifications of the conditions of economic life (such as perfect foresight, perfect mobility of the factors of production, perfect divisibility of goods, etc.) the economist deduces his first broad principles or propositions by way of first approximation toward a complete explanation of the operation of the economic system. But fruitfully to apply these principles to the more complex conditions of economic life, it is necessary that these main postulates be supplemented by a great number of subsidiary assumptions of an historico-relative character, such as, e. g., market conditions, the number of buyers and sellers, the institutional and

legal framework of exchange and production, etc. The "truth of the deductions from this structure depends, as always, on their logical consistency. Their applicability to the interpretation of any particular situation depends upon the existence in that situation of the elements postulated." (Robbins, *op. cit.*, p. 79.) The first principles or propositions of general economic analysis are as universally applicable as the broad assumptions upon which they are based. Their particular applications will depend upon the nature of the facts or subsidiary assumptions which may vary widely over space or time. By providing such material necessary for the interpretation of a particular situation, descriptive or historical economics can do a great service to analytical economics. But the first can never become a substitute rather than a complement for the second.

Like all other sciences, economics uses also the method of isolation, i. e., of separating the various elements in a complex situation and considering them one at a time, using the important proviso "ceteris paribus" or "other things remaining the same." Such abstraction is necessary when you cannot grasp the situation as a whole. It breaks up the complex situation into its component parts and studies them separately. Then the elements must be brought together again in a final synthesis and viewed in their proper relationships.

Finally, economic analysis makes use of the method of successive approximations, i. e., of proceeding from the simpler to the more complex. This method is likewise common to all the sciences. The physicist, for example, if asked to give the formula for a falling body under specific conditions would first have to know the formula for the force of gravity in a vacuum, then the power of the other forces that might be working with or against the force of gravity in this particular situation. In like manner the economist in his first approximation deduces his broad generalizations from the data of observation we have called the main postulates of his science; then in his subsequent closer approximations toward reality he must investigate how these conclusions will be modified by the nature of the subsidiary postulates which are present in any particular case. On this basis of successive approximations towards reality the theory of economics is divided into: 1) the theory of static equilibrium; 2) the theory of comparative statics; and 3) the theory of dynamics, each of which is again subdivided into: a) the theory of valuation and exchange, and b) the theory of production and distribution.

With these considerations in view we are now in a position to investigate the nature of economics as a positive science and its relation

to social philosophy. When we say that economics is a positive (as opposed to a normative) science we mean that it is not concerned with value judgments of an ethical or moral character. It abstracts from the ethical implications of all human conduct which falls within its subject-matter. It is concerned only with how men do act, and with the consequences of their actions, not with how they should be. He takes as data the proximate ends or wants which men desire to satisfy, and the form their conduct takes in the use of the limited means over which they have disposal for the attainment of those ends — without inquiring into the moral good or evil of either. That he leaves to the moralist or social philosopher (which may mean to himself in another capacity if he is a trained moral philosopher as well as an economist). The justification of this separation of the tasks of the economist and of the moralist is that it makes accessible to economic science the benefits of specialization or division of labor which has proved so fruitful in all fields of human activity, not least in that of the positive sciences. If the economist had to stop and determine the ethical significance of each new assumption he made with respect to human conduct in his attempt to explain the operation of our complex economic system, or if economic analysis were left to the moralist who ventured into that field only when required to seek therein an explanation of economic phenomena for the solution of a moral problem, economics would not have made the progress that has followed its clear-cut demarcation from the other social sciences as a distinct and well-defined specialism.

In the frequent discussions one witnesses with respect to the "ethical neutrality of economics," or whether economics may legitimately be divorced from ethics, considerable confusion has resulted from a very loose use of the term "economics." In popular discussion of this character the term "economics" is often used in two very different senses. It may (as it should for purposes of scientific accuracy) refer to: 1) ECONOMIC SCIENCE, which includes both, a) the pure theory of economics, i. e., a systematized body of knowledge explaining the operation of the economic system on the basis of given data, and b) applied economics, which uses the principles or tools fashioned by economic theory for the solution of practical problems. Now between economics in the sense of a positive economic science and ethics there can and, as we have noted previously, there should be a clear line of demarcation. The validity of its conclusions will depend not upon any moral principles, but on the criteria of logical truth. The practicality of economic science will depend upon the

closeness with which the assumptions of economic theory approximate to the conditions of real life. But the term economics may also be used to signify: 2) economic policy, which is concerned not with theory but with action, with prescribing what should or should not be done, with passing value judgments upon economic ends, institutions, behavior, etc., such as competition, free trade, laissez-faire, the economic motive, collective bargaining, monetary policy, etc. If used in this sense economics patently cannot be divorced from ethics. For economic policy, which is concerned with what should be, is a part of the broader field of social philosophy or of applied ethics. But before attempting to solve the problems in this field one should be familiar with the principles *both* of ethics and of economic science. (Cf., e. g., the different approaches to such a subject as minimum wage legislation taken by: 1) economic theory, 2) applied economics, and 3) economic policy.)

The common objection brought against the "ethical neutrality" of economics as a positive science, viz., that it prohibits economists (who are particularly well qualified to do so) from going on and discussing questions of public policy of an economic nature, is based upon a misapprehension. On the one hand, it is not only highly desirable but necessary that those interested in the solution of the problems of social justice should have an adequate knowledge of the scientific principles of economics. And on the other hand, it is a matter of historical fact that all great economists have been keenly interested in the practical application of the conclusions of their science to problems of social reform and of social amelioration. In fact many (such as Marshall and Wicksteed) entered the field of economic science with the express purpose of acquiring that understanding of the operation of the economic system which they believed to be indispensable for the solution of the great social problems of their day. But when the economist steps out of the field of economic science which is concerned only with what is (or with what would follow from certain assumptions) and into that of economic policy (which is concerned with what ought to be) he is speaking no longer as an economist but as a moralist or social philosopher. And for that he must have qualifications not only of an economist but of a social philosopher as well. That is, he must be capable not merely of ascertaining the most efficient *means* to be used for the attainment of any given end (for economics is neutral as between ends) but also of evaluating, of passing moral judgment upon the

ends themselves, whether these are particular ends within a given social system or alternative social systems.

Thus the practical significance of economic science is to be found in the light which it throws on the implications of choice, i. e., upon the attainability of any particular end or objective, and the possible alternatives that must be sacrificed in choosing that particular objective. To quote again from Professor Robbins, "It is not rational to will a certain end if one is not conscious of what sacrifice the achievement of that end involves." (Loc. cit., p. 155.) And it is neither rational to will nor possible to achieve a given constellation of ends in any social program unless one is aware of the implications of each of these ends, and unless the achievements of all these ends are mutually compatible. This truth could not escape the notice even of a casual observer of the experience of our present government in the field of social reform. Yet the economist in undertaking to throw light upon the implications of any particular objective is likely to prove a very unpopular fellow. By the individual or the group whether of buyers or of sellers, of management or of labor) bent only on the achievement of its own selfish interests at whatever cost to society he will probably be accused of class bias. To political partisans interested in economics only as a possible arsenal from which to choose weapons that will bludgeon their opponents into silence, his warnings and protests are but those of a mere academic theorist. (Cf. example of the Prime Minister and the tariff related by Pigou.) To the utopian dreamer blinded to all reality by his infatuation with the vision of communist bliss, he is guilty of employing the false criteria of bourgeois rather than that of proletarian logic. But in the midst of this and even more hostile criticism he must, if he is to serve the cause of social justice and of social betterment, remain aloof from the blandishments and emoluments of popular favor, impartial, sanely critical, jealous of the interests of honesty, sincerity and truth; mindful of the words of Professor Marshall: "Students of social science must fear popular approval; evil is with them when all men speak well of them. If there is any set of opinions by the advocacy of which a newspaper can increase its sales, then the student . . . is bound to dwell on the limitations and defects and errors, if any, in that set of opinions; and never to advocate them unconditionally even in an *ad hoc* discussion. It is almost impossible for a student to be a true patriot and to have the reputation of being one at the same time." (Quoted in Pigou, op. cit., pp. 10-11.)

In the field of theoretical achievement — economics is one of the humblest as well as of the youngest of sciences. It cannot, like the physical sciences, shatter the atom; neither can it weigh the imponderable masses of the stars, nor measure the limitless distances of the solar system. But in the field of practical significance for improving the lot of mankind it need yield honors to none. For with the knowledge afforded by its theoretical analysis the social reformer can, in the apt phrase of Philip Wicksteed, harness the economic forces to the social ear. "The enlightened student of political economy and of society will take care to assume nothing as to the economic forces except the constant pressure which they bring to bear upon men's actions and their absolute moral and social indifference. He will see that it is our business in every instance to endeavor to yoke these forces, where he can, to social work, and to restrain them, where he can, from social devastation. . . . It is clear that action taken for this purpose is groping and often blind; and further that want of clear knowledge of the deeply enrooted nature and the irrevocably fixed boundaries of the facts and forces with which we are dealing causes incalculable waste of social effort and enthusiasm. . . . If any essential light can be thrown on the actual nature and the spontaneous action of the forces that we endeavor at every turn to direct, to check and to control, the mind of man can scarcely be applied to a more august or urgent task than that of elucidating them." Thus the economist "can help to guide if he cannot inspire. If he can give no strength he can save strength from being wasted. It is his misery that he cannot glorify the purpose to which he ministers, but it is his triumph that he can be glorified by them. He works in faith, for he knows that his work is barren unless others greater than he are working too; but he believes that wherever they are he can save them. If he can give sight to some blind reforming Samson he too has served." (Wicksteed, *op. cit.*, pp. 210, 191-2, 207-8, 123-4.)

If any doubt still remains in the minds of our readers as to the purpose of our message in this economist's "apologia pro scientia sua," let us state briefly in conclusion that economics is not sociology (whether this is defined as a distinct specialism or as a synthesis of all the social sciences); and that neither economics nor sociology as positive sciences is mere applied ethics. Each of these is a science in its own right, with its own methods and its own purposes to fulfill. Yet all meet on the borderlands of social thought, that everyman's land where the social sciences contact one another and all contact

ethics or social philosophy for discussion and mutual agreement upon problems common to all. In this region of cooperative counsel we believe that social philosophy and economics are supplementary and mutually helpful to each other, the latter assisting the former in its evaluation of the objectives of social policy by analyzing the implications of choice of any given end and the most efficient method of achieving it. For this reason we believe a thorough training in the methods of economic analysis to be indispensable to the social philosopher working in the field of economic and social reform. In an era in which *soi-disant* economists and dispensers of social sweetness and light discourse with all the dogmatism of prophets divinely inspired on the methods of operating an alleged "economy of abundance," we dare to be old-fashioned enough to champion the practical significance of a science based on the existence of a scarcity of means relative to satisfying in an adequate manner even the more important wants of society. Realizing the vitally important rôle played by education in the maintenance and advancement of social welfare by democratic government and democratic institutions, we deplore the extent to which popular approval is accorded (even by allegedly educated persons) to the host of economic panaceas, nostrums, "isms," fallacies and semi-fallacies which spring up like proverbial mushrooms in the dark, dark shadows of an educational system averse to the effort of exact thought. We regret the tendency, characteristic of the American habit of wanting to get things done in a hurry, to undertake the solution of economic problems without a knowledge of economic theory adequate enough to throw all the light at its disposal on the implications of solutions proffered. (Unfortunately, Catholic textbooks on economic and social problems are not altogether free from censure in this respect.) If economic science is blind as to the ends, social philosophy would be blind as to the methods of achieving its ends without the light afforded by economic analysis. This service as a handmaid to social philosophy marks the practical significance and the crowning glory of economic science.

## The Possibility and Scope of a Supernatural Sociology

FRANZ MUELLER

Some years ago one of the better-known dogmatic theologians of the last generation penned the following lines in a book<sup>1</sup> which was often referred to in his day:

A new field of knowledge and truth seems to be opened up in sociology which appears to demand its proper place in serving to make manifest the realities of revelation. Not only the ninth article of the Apostles' Creed, but almost every word, shows that sociological realities are illuminated in an extraordinary degree by the light of revelation. The religious and theological implications of the expressions, "God, the Father Almighty," "the only-begotten Son," "our Lord," are explicit invitations for establishment of a sociological theology.

The fact that the few undisputed conclusions which sociology has produced have not been incorporated into theology itself, but have been only incidentally recognized as they may have furthered pastoral practice, is, of course, not the fault of theology itself but of theologians.<sup>2</sup>

The full meaning of this passage appears, of course, only when it is read in its context, but this article does not permit further quotation. It was said author's purpose to show that the important and essential conclusions of an empirical sociology clearly point to the theological background of social life. In other words: the natural interhuman relations which are the subject matter of empirical sociology correspond to certain supernatural interconnections between men themselves and between men and God. As an inductive science dealing with the material and proximate causes of the integration of men into social relations and structures, empirical sociology can go no farther than the mere surface of things.<sup>3</sup> But the study of the "individuation" of social "forms," and of the secondary causes active

<sup>1</sup> Karl Eschweiler: *Die zwei Wege der neueren Theologie*, Augsburg, 1926; p. 242.

<sup>2</sup> The ninth article of the Apostles' Creed reads: "(I believe in) the Holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints. . . ."

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Franz Mueller, What is Sociology? *The Fleur de Lis*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, pp. 30-34.

in social life, with which sociology must be content, does nevertheless urgently invite us to go farther into a more profound study of these phenomena.

The true sociologist will find that he is constantly being urged to go on into the realm of social metaphysics, where he will find the key to the study of the formal causes and the final causes of social phenomena. More than this: he will be confronted with the problem of the supernatural causes of interhuman processes and their religious implications. Just as we may ascend from the study of psychology to philosophical anthropology and then on to a consideration of theological anthropology, so we may follow the path from empirical sociology to social metaphysics and on to the science of social theology or sacred sociology.

This theological sociology differs from natural sociology in that it does not found itself upon experience but rather on revelation; it differs also from social metaphysics which bases itself on speculation. Social theology is closely related to theological anthropology which concerns itself primarily with human nature in its integral, fallen, and redeemed state, as these terms are used in theology, viz., the state of nature, *naturae integrae, lapsae, et reparatae*. The study of man's social faculty is as closely related to the study of his nature as is the study of his personality in the metaphysical rather than psychological sense of the word. Again, these two, his personal and social aspects, do not refer only to his earthly existence, but they extend into the realm of his supernatural origin and destiny. That which is recognized as belonging to man's very nature cannot be confined to his mode of existence in time and space alone, unless we would be willing to admit that his social faculty were derived from his deficiency or from the limitations of his being which come from his corporeity.

Not a few Christian thinkers have actually been of the opinion that man seeks the company of his kind because he finds that he is unable to perform certain tasks alone, or because he, at least, finds the cooperation of others profitable and useful to himself. We find this opinion most strongly defended in classical Protestant theology which teaches that the state, private property, and labor have their origin in sin.

Anyone who argues thus overlooks the fact that even before the fall man was a social being. Proof of this is found primarily in his faculty of speech; besides, we have the direct testimony of the Scriptures: "It is not good for man," God said, "to be alone: let us make

him a help like unto himself" (Gen. 2:18). And Adam, his mind still untroubled by the darkness which sin would bring with it, understood after Eve's creation that from thence forward man would always be born into a family, that he would marry and found new families (Gen. 2:24). Thus the foundation was laid for human society. From the words of almighty God it is clear that it was His plan that one man should be the other's helper, or "help," and that, in other words, the fundamental reason of society should be mutual help and cooperation. Thus even in the state of original innocence and grace, endowed with the praeternatural gifts of integrity and immortality, men were destined to living with each other and even to some labor (Gen 2:15). Since other human beings are bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh, they will feel attracted toward each other and they will "cleave" to each other. From the beginning, then, sociability and cooperation manifested themselves in human nature.

But that which, before the fall, had been the source of the joys of Paradise, now, after the fall of man, became an oppressive necessity and even a burden. In other words: after man had lost his praeternatural gifts, i. e., when his sensible, corporeal appetites were no longer directly ordered toward God, the body rebelled against the spirit, and the body became a burden to the soul. Now the deficiencies of a body which was no longer under the undisputed sway of the soul became evident. It is easy to imagine that from now on any cooperation, and any suppression of individual interests for the sake of the common good would be considered rather an unavoidable evil than a fulfilment of a natural inclination. Now one was inclined to think more of the mutual dependence of men upon each other than of their original determination to social life.

This fact, no doubt, has led many social scientists to consider man's imperfections and limitations to be the cause and basis of his social life. These scientists forget that the mutual cooperation of which we are speaking is possible only when nature has made provisions for it. Here, too, action follows the nature of being, *agere sequitur esse*; only because man is a social *being*, only because both his soul and body from the beginning are predisposed to live in society, is he able to meet the practical demands of human living-together, i. e., lead a social life. Even in Paradise man was a concrete individual, i. e., he was a partial realization of the universal and complete idea of man. At the same time, however, he was and still is a spiritual individual, a being endowed with intelligence and free will — a per-

son, a rational being complete in himself and to himself — *totus in se et sibi*. In contrast to the rest of earthly creation which is irrational, the Creator gave man the power to reflect, consciously and willingly, the divine plenitude of being. Man's social character consists in this, that he feels inclined to share with other men the wealth of his personal values and natural endowments and gifts. According to G. Gundlach, S.J., we find true society only there where men share with one another their gifts, talents, especially those things which make them images of God, and when they do this in order to honor God, the Highest Good.<sup>4</sup> Society is constructed into a hierarchy of ordered unities or wholes, each of which serves the attainment of some particular good, and thus through humanity as a whole with its great variety and multiformity caused by time and space society manifests God the Perfect Good.

These remarks should be sufficient to indicate that it is not feasible to base man's social character on the limitations of his mode of existence alone. Man is the image of God not only in his personality but also in his social nature. Just as a rational individual man is an image of the divine distinction in persons, so he is an image of the Blessed Trinity in his social aspect, a "likeness of the Blessed Trinity with its oneness of being."<sup>5</sup> Undoubtedly, therefore, God thought of man from all eternity as a social being.

That man is a social being is further corroborated by the fact that original justice was conferred on Adam and Eve as a heritable gift. By their fall our first parents lost the gift of integrity and the adoption as children of God not only for themselves but for all their posterity. The reconciliation of fallen human nature could be accomplished only by a restoration of the interrupted union of man with God. Because the Son of God became man and expiated sin by

<sup>4</sup> *Gregorianum*, Vol. XVII (1936), pp. 287-289; also St. Bonaventure was of the opinion that the main reason for the plurality of souls is that they thus reveal the goodness of God. This goodness shines the more, the more souls there are to whom God may distribute His gifts: *Principalis ratio est ad manifestationem bonitatis divinae; et haec praecipue est in animabus, quae multae sunt, ut eis distribuatur gratiarum Dei multiformitas, et compleetur illius supernae civitatis integritas et numerositas* (II S. 18, 2, 1, ad 3; t. 2, p. 447). Another reason according to Bonaventure, is the love of men toward each other, for it is just the living together of those who are like-minded in good things which is the source of great joy: *quia amor caritatis exsultat in multitudine bonae societatis* (II, 3, 1, 2 ad 2; t. 2, p. 104).

<sup>5</sup> J. Husslein, S. J., *The Church and Social Problems*, New York, 1912, p. 195.

His death on the cross the abyss between God and man was bridged. But men can cross this bridge to God only when they unite themselves with Christ, when they follow His leadership and make use of the fruits of grace merited by the sacrifice of the cross. Those who accept Christ as their Head, thus become companions of His Godhead, members of His mystical body. We can easily see that the concept of the Church, of the New Testament in His blood is essentially "sociological" or rather "social." The re-presentation of the sacrifice of the cross in the celebration of the Eucharist is carried out in a social form inasmuch as the faithful offer themselves up *with* Christ in atonement to the heavenly Father. All the sacraments are supplied by the sacrifice of Jesus and are the means by which the God-man makes accessible to souls the graces of justification which He merited for us on the cross. Sanctifying grace consists in our incorporation, or our re-incorporation in Christ; in our being filled, therefore, with divine life. As members of the Son of God we now attain to the sonship of God and we enter into the communion of saints.

More patent and clear than the sociological relevance of the mystical body, of the Church, or of the communion of saints, is that of the city of God, the kingdom of God, or of the kingdom and kingship of Christ. The realities which are represented by these concepts can be understood only in reference to man's social nature and his social destiny. All the great theologians, from the Fathers of the Church down to J. A. Moehler, M. J. Scheeben, Cardinal Newman, T. Soiron, O.F.M., R. Guardini, and Karl Adam of our own day understood and taught the social aspects of the relationship between God and man.

The liturgical movement is now trying to make the modern layman conscious of his social aspect. Nevertheless we still are inclined to think first of all of the *ethical* obligations of the individual Christian to his fellowmen when we speak of the relation between Christianity and society. We often confuse the precepts of the natural law, which really belong in the anteroom of the Church, with the specifically Christian social ethics, which have a supernatural foundation. We fall into this confusion principally because we neglect the study of the being and the supernatural which underlies and precedes this ethic. The efforts of the pastoral ministry and the teaching of Christian morals have obtained such relatively small success in the restoration and Christianizing of society partly because the average Christian somehow remains a stranger to the religious background of Christian social theory and ethics. This deficiency cannot be cor-

rected only by the increase of social action in the traditional sense, i.e., by more organization and moral instruction. We must — as Father Fursey rightly emphasized time and again — go back to a study of the theology of interhuman relations and of the supernatural foundations of society, and recall the more profound reasons for which we should maintain a Christian attitude toward our fellow-man.

The specifically social aspect of the truths of religion could and should be treated and developed in a theological sociology. We might call it sacred sociology, social theology, or even supernatural sociology. It would be based on revelation and on the doctrine and practice of the Church. It should not, however, be confused with the sociology of religion. It would be the supernatural complement of empirical sociology. The sociology of religion, however, as contradistinguished from religious or theological sociology, is a branch of empirical sociology, indeed of the so-called cultural sociology, and it is closely related to the so-called sociology of knowledge. Sociology of religion merely inquires into the factual effects of certain religious teachings and practices on the structure of society, and also on the effect of the structure of society on the manner and method (not the content) of religious thought and practice.

It is quite evident that the problem treated by the sociology of religion, the influence and contribution of religious attitudes and behavior to the "individuation" of society is not identical with the direct formation of social being through supernatural principles and entities. We must clearly distinguish between the formal object of these two sciences, but this does not prohibit them from working together hand in hand. Frequently theological sociology will be able to supply the answer to problems in empirical sociology, while empirical sociology will often serve as a theodicy in substantiating the supernatural truths of theological sociology. This theological sociology must above all things guard against any exaggerated supernaturalism and spiritualism; it must constantly keep in mind that the supernatural is built on the natural, and that God, the final cause, does not invalidate the natural, created, so-called secondary causes, which He Himself called into being.

The formal object of a theological sociology would be limited to a study of the supernatural entities and forces which influence the relations of men with each other, affecting the integration and disintegration of social structures.

## Has America a Personality?

THOMAS J. SULLIVAN

America has an Aladdin complex. Whatever be its personality, certainly the overwhelming yen to be served is implicit to the American mentality. If that be so, perhaps it might be possible to psychoanalyze the nation's total personality and uncover a probable culture complex basic to the present condition of American life. If, as president Hutchins of Chicago University points out, the object of American education is to train men to make as much money as possible and stay out of jail, must we infer equal loftiness to the remainder of the nation's cultural ideals? If the medical men of the country offer the American family an immorality as therapeutic, it might be legitimate to suspect the doctors of *lèse-humanité* and wonder what must be the diagnosis and prognosis of the family as a culture institution. If American music, to which the thirty millions of dancing age are swinging, and attest to be true American music, has no appeal even to a keen sensualist, as someone so bitterly put it, it might be interesting to inquire aenent the total of the country's art pattern.

Thus, if such disparate factors as education and the dance are part of the country's culture pattern, it will make for clarity and minimize cavil to vivisect culture and examine precisely what it is before suggesting some kind of national narcosis.

Culture is to the nation as personality is to the individual. It is a nation's reaction to its environment, a nation's reaction to itself — the objective aspect of personality. It has nothing to do with sugar tongs or tuxedos. Personality distinguishes one person from another; culture distinguishes nations. It is our social heritage, that environmental bloc in which are actuated all the physical, mental and moral potencies of our biological heritage. In a nation it has the same causes as has personality in an individual: intellect, environment, the genetico-biologic makeup and the occupational or economic factor. And the greatest of these is intellect, the vitalizing agent of all culture. What distinguishes man from the brute is his intellect; what distinguishes human society from brute society is culture.

Thus to say that our national cultural milieu exerts tremendous influence on an individual or on society is quite correct, but it is non-

sense to say that such influence dominates and determines societal or personal conduct. A nation's culture is continually being shaped, changed and built up by personalities simultaneously with its shaping, changing and building of those personalities. It is not enough, then, to say that culture is so simple a thing as adaptation to an environment since it has come into existence to satisfy the real needs of man in a far more fundamental way than a mere physical or psychological adjustment. A nation's culture is a projection of the individual's personality, his physical, mental and moral integer extended into the objective world, acting and interacting with the projected personality of every other citizen to form the social personality, the nation's culture.

But the culture synthesis is not an integrated confusion. Its fundamental institutions, if not separated, can at least be distinguished. Eight may be named, permanent and universal:

Family	Language
Social Organization	Philosophy
Religion	Art
Private Property	Material Culture

I do not mean that these eight basic institutions are independent; I do not mean that they are merely correlated; what I mean is that each responds to some human appetite, to some need of man as a social and intellectual animal. En bloc they respond to man's four fundamental wishes: the wish for security, for new experience, for power and for response and companionship. With these eight factors in mind, it is possible for the sociologist to take the pulse and diagnose the true cultural worth of any civilization or any age. The throb of cultural life comes to the surface of the social body at eight points. Examine these points and you have the present condition of the American national personality.

Five hundred years before Christ, Confucius insisted that the family was the social cell out of which the community and the state developed. With Christianity, marriage and the family took on a new dignity, a new importance — until today's socialization of the functions of the home. This depersonalization is dominating and most prominent in Russia and Germany, but signs of familial dilapidation can be seen everywhere in the Western world. Here in America, atrophy is following the discard of old sex standards and family sanctities, the decline of religion, the legalization of birth control, the shrugging at abortion and the spread of the monogamy-is-a-good-

thing-if-we-could-get-somebody-to-try-it kind of cynicism. Certainly it is a far cry from our Irish grandmothers' notion of family to Woolcott's definition of marriage. But there is the hope that the sullen peace which must come to a Nazi-Americo-Japanese world of 1941, will bring a renascence of the Christian family here in the United States.

As a result of the cellular dissolution, the social organization has about equal stability. We learned in school that society is a stable moral union marked by authority, cooperation, permanence, plurality and community of aim. It includes government, law, labor, organization, political party, even the sundry scientific and artistic societies — in short, the whole tremendous bulk of the modern social pyramid. Look across America at the political and labor picture. Examine the present conscription bill and see if Americans are not asked to choose between security and liberty. To achieve prosperity they must renounce their rights; to have national solidarity they must stifle any vague kind of 5th column. All of which is legitimate, of course, if the people want it; but the 1940 American sociologist looks at it, shakes his head and murmurs — be aware!

Even Walter Lippmann offers man's intrinsic human dignity as basic to a solution. The Catholic Church offers religion, that dignity's *sine qua non*, as the solution. Fundamental to religion of any kind is a feeling of dependence; and because no longer — at least, not till the stock crash of 1929 and the present European clash of arms — does man acknowledge any dependence, no longer is he religious in a conscious, practical way. Science and the state have assured him, "Trust in us and you have need for no other God." From which infantile faith follows the apparent genesis of the "new immorality" and irreligion: no dependence, no God; no God, no obligation; no obligation, no morality; for morality has its ultimate obligation in the will of the Creator who fashioned man's nature with its full splendor of human dignity.

Hence, just as religion gives to the individual personality dignity, hope and inspiration, so does it give to the corporate personality — the nation's culture — a new dignity, a new hope, a glorious inspiration. Let it not escape, every civilization, even the United States, must have some religion, some spiritual dynamic; what Durkheim describes as "the womb from which come all the germs of human civilization." Christopher Dawson shrewdly finds our modern religious impulse disguised under philosophical and political forms and calls it the "religion of progress."

If there is a divinity in this "religion of progress" it is wealth, identified in our discussion as private property. Its high-priests are the financial dictators across the world; its faithful are the rest of us, unless we happen to be Christian with that strange eschatological yen for something more than wealth. But despite the arresting Communist naïvete about the non-importance of who shall hold title to property, man does possess the inherent, individual, natural and inalienable right to own, use or dispose of goods. This institution, like the other seven basic to culture, contributes essentially to making man man and lifts him further above the animal. Its origin lies not in positive law, abuse, contract or custom, but is natural to man, conferred by and grounded on natural law.

While in Russia man's nature is slowly working itself to the surface of Soviet brutalizing, here in America are appearing the first suggestions that we are in danger of losing our sense of private property. Andre Gide predicted that the next generation will bring out an aristocracy of money in Russia. I wonder if he examined the present American situation, would his prognosis for our next generation not contain a heavily conditioned institution of private property. "They are saving the child and losing the god," they are saving the nation and losing the internationale, was his cry aenent Russia. With slight accommodation he might use the same epigram for America: "They are saving the child and losing the goddess" of liberty.

But more intimate to man than his possessions is his faculty of self-expression. All that culture which follows from speech must be attributed to intelligence. Man's culture includes language because man's makeup includes intellect. He speaks because he has something to say, because he reasons, because he has an intellect. The significance of language in culture is uniquely social; it is the means of human group cooperation, of standardizing belief and action, of community control, of influencing the minds of others. But language in America today, at least in its cultural aspect, appears to be almost a prostitution. The theater, radio and current literature stink with vulgarity and propaganda; our daily newspaper, although the bright spot in the world's press, sometimes demonstrates thought and speech to be only a little less vassalized than in the *Pravda*-ridden Soviet.

Every man has his philosophy of life; every nation has its dominant philosophy of life. The ultimate reasons and causes have always been the proper object of philosophy, but modernity's think-

ers seem satisfied with investigating the proximate, immediate causation — what they would minimize to a mere "routine of perception." Here in America we oppose a bread-and-butter kind of materialism to a rational, philosophic spirituality; we oppose time to eternity, determinism to free-will, becoming to being; and over against true thinking is placed a thoughtless social extroversion, making wealth, power and the sensate the bases of our national cultural values. Whence follows the prehensile egotism that bulks so importantly in the modern American family and religion and pervades the whole social organism.

But an American is more than a philosopher. He does more than merely survive in his familial and social existence. He is an artist and a connoisseur of art. I do not speak of pictorial art simply nor necessarily of the fine arts. As a basic culture pattern, art transcends the whole aesthetic experience of man from music to architecture; it fuses beauty with utility in an attempt to respond to man's thirst for eternal beauty. Its social significance is tremendous because it reflects the society from which it springs. Architecture, the drama, prose and poetry, painting and sculpture embody the ideals of the nation that produces them; Phidias, Shakespeare, Beethoven, Raphael personify the true cultural values of the ages in which they lived. Grim and disturbing is the outlook with American art what it is. In line, form, color, sound and word it is stamped by femininity. Everywhere it is found materialistic, utilitarian, erotic. And because it does seem to reflect America's ideals, to eliminate the sensate, those ideals must be disciplined to virility and strength. Could it be that conscription — just a taste of militarism — might effect that discipline?

But it is in material culture that the modern world glories. Family, religion and social structure may be tottering; philosophy may be nonsense; art in decay; but never since the world began has man so controlled nature. To the unthinking, science is still omnipotent and omniscient. Technology, medicine, sanitation — the whole gamut of natural phenomena has been run; progress is endless; all reality can be explained in terms of the mechanical. Nations rise or fall according as their armies are motorized, mechanized or not. And still in the van of this full-blooded technocratic confidence is America, although feeling at the moment a kind of ambivalence: a certain uncomfortable sobering at the pockets and at once a strange itch for a motorized sword.

This discussion of culture, although adequate, is obviously incomplete. As Frank Sheed points out, however, the educated man need not know everything, but he must know where everything is, where it fits into the total picture. Keeping the octagonal skeleton of family, social organization, private property, religion, language, art, philosophy and material culture in mind, it is possible to look at life, to go through the intricate maze of the morning paper, with its cross-section of life, perfectly oriented in the significance of each item, critical of the whole; not knowing everything but knowing where everything fits into our modern labyrinthine civilization.

Aware of the constituents of that civilization — eight new points of reference — it is possible for the sociologist to understand the normal dominance of the spiritual factor, the dynamism of religion, the basicness of the family, the significance of art. Then can be judged the abnormalcy of modern America and the imperative necessity of depreciating the material and reordering our nation with the spiritual at the center — perfectly assured that it is not enough to say that God's in his heaven, all's right with the world, since, as Chesterton put it, it might well be true that God has left His heaven to make things right with the world. Christ is that God. It is the business of the Christian sociologist, the business of America and of the modern world to find Him once more, to replace Him in our individual and social personality — at the center of our cultural life. Then will America have achieved her true personality.

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## NEWS OF SOCIOLOGICAL INTEREST

The third annual convention of the American Catholic Sociological Society will be held in Chicago, beginning Saturday morning, December 28, and ending at noon on Monday, December 30. The scene of the convention headquarters and meetings will be the Chicago Towers on North Michigan Avenue.

Meetings will be devoted to the discussions of the following subjects: Christian social concepts, crime and delinquency, the family, socio-economic problems, rural life, the community, and racial origins. There will be round tables on the introductory course in sociology, the major sequence in sociology, and high school sociology. Students attending the convention will have a meeting of their own.

Groups desiring alumnae, alumni, or other organizational meetings or luncheons during the convention should inform the executive-secretary so that announcements can be printed in the convention program. Evenings during the days of the convention will be left open for informal discussions and groups who may wish to call special meetings.

Some outstanding sociologists of the American Sociological Society will attend and address the convention. The program will be published in the December issue of the REVIEW.

The 1940 meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Charities will take place in Chicago at the Stevens Hotel, November 17-20. The Rev. Walter McGuinn, S.J., Ph.D., of the Boston College School of Social Work will chairman the meeting of the "Committee on Families." Dr. Henry Schumacher of the Cleveland Child Guidance Clinic will speak on "Delinquency and Human Personality." Other members of the ACSS are on the program.

An interesting phase in the development of the liturgical movement will be the "Liturgical Week" to be held in Chicago October 21-25. Further information concerning the program and activities may be had by writing to The Executive Secretary, 7416 Ridge Ave., Chicago, Illinois.

The American Sociological Society's annual meeting will take place in Chicago, December 27-29. The various sections and divisions are as follows: social research, human ecology, social biology, the family, sociology and psychiatry, social statistics, educational sociology, sociology and religion, political sociology, criminology, community,

sociology of social problems. Meeting concurrently are the American Association for Labor Legislation, The American Political Science Association, American Statistical Association, American Association of Law School Professors, and the National Conference on Family Relations.

The eighteenth annual convention of the National Catholic Rural Life conference was held September 29 to October 2. Interesting feature of the four day meetings is that only four formal addresses of more than fifteen minutes each found place in the program of the convention. These were the presidential address by Bishop Vincent J. Ryan; Bishop Edwin V. O'Hara, honorary president of the ACSS, spoke on "Agriculture and the Catholic Church"; Carl C. Taylor of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, "Agriculture and the National Crisis." Monday, September 30, was devoted completely to young people, and the entire day was spent in the many and varied problems of rural youth. Tuesday, Divisional meetings on religious instruction; and missionary work; rural education; rural social welfare; the productive home; cooperatives; land acquisition: the land for whom? the fertility and maintenance of soil made up the program for Tuesday. Sectional meetings for priests, Sisters, men, and women completed the program on Wednesday. Members of the ACSS who participated in the program were: Rt. Rev. Luigi Ligutti, Rev. John C. Rawe, S.J., Rev. Martin Schirber, O.S.B., Rev. Raymond P. Duggan, and Sister Anne, O.S.B., Rev. Ralph A. Gallagher, S.J., Executive Secretary, represented the Society and participated in the discussions.

Labor schools for men and women workers are again being conducted throughout the country. These schools are under the direction of the social science divisions of the various colleges. Some of the schools that have come to our attention are at St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia; St. Francis Xavier, New York; Loyola University, Chicago; Rockhurst College, Kansas City; and San Francisco University. Notices concerning other labor schools would be greatly appreciated.

The United States Housing Authority issues a weekly publication, "Public Housing." College teachers, particularly social scientists, will find it an invaluable manual for week to week developments in the housing situation. The publication is sent free to all college instructors who request it.

Continuing a practice of several years' standing, the Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Brooklyn grants annually ten scholarships to the School of Social Service at Fordham University. Awards are made to men and women of the metropolitan area in the form of

tuition scholarships. Colleges represented in the current year awards were Fordham University, Hunter College, St. John's University, Manhattanville College, and St. Joseph's College for Women, Brooklyn.

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The Rev. Edwin C. Mulligan, S.J., assistant professor of sociology at St. Joseph's College, attended the Conference on Family Relations at Harvard University. "Tomorrow's Children" was the topic discussed.

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Miss Eva J. Ross has joined the faculty of Trinity College, Washington, D.C. A new edition of her college text has gone to press.

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The College of St. Benedict announces the addition of Sister Brigid, O.S.B., to its sociology department.

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Father McGuinn, S.J., Dean of the Boston College School of Social Work, was recently appointed by Frances E. Perkins and Oscar Powell to serve on the Special Advisory Committee on Training and Personnel to advise the Children's Bureau and the Public Assistance Bureau of the Social Security Board.

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Father Hubert C. Callaghan, S.J., is now a member of the sociology department at the College of the Holy Cross.

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Dr. Franz Mueller of the College of St. Thomas will present a paper on "What Constitutes a Sociology of Religion" at the convention of the American Sociological Society.

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Fordham University announces that Dr. N. S. Timasheff has been appointed assistant professor of sociology.

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A new program of courses in labor economics and public administration is being offered this year at Loyola University, Chicago. The courses are being offered through the sociology department. The plan is to train men and women for careers in public service.

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A plan for student membership in the American Catholic Sociological Society has been completed. Information concerning the arrangement will be sent to all the universities and colleges. It is interesting to note that the young people who planned the program of the

student section of the convention last December, Miss Mary Margaret Mitchell of Mundelein College, Mary Gorman and Betty Rolfs of Rosary College, and Edward Marciak of Loyola University, took an active part in the Catholic Youth Congress held in Chicago, October 4-6 which was devoted to a consideration of the social problems confronting youth today.

The next issue of the REVIEW will be in the mails in the early part of December. Articles, news items, and book reviews should be submitted before the 25th of November. Included in the REVIEW, will be a program of the convention, articles on social theory and social practice. A new service of bibliographies and topical outlines is planned. Pages of the REVIEW are open to its subscribers and members of the Society.

Members of the ACSS are asked to cooperate with Miss Marguerite Reuss of Marquette University, Milwaukee, in the preparation of her annual Research Census. This is perhaps the finest individual contribution of any member of the ACSS. Miss Reuss was given a vote of thanks at the last convention of the ACSS.

Information concerning the cost of reprints of articles appearing in the REVIEW may be had from the executive-secretary.

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ACSS AND READERS:

This quarterly is designed to serve your interest and to provide a medium and a forum for the expression of Catholic social thought.

The editorial board would appreciate any suggestions you might have to offer. Articles are also accepted for the REVIEW. Communications may be mailed to

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW  
Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Rd., Chicago, Illinois

BOOK REVIEWS

**Sociology.** By Willigan and O'Connor, Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1940, 380 pp., \$2.00.

This is a very good text, combining many of the excellencies of Dr. Murray's *INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY* and Dr. Haas's *MAN AND SOCIETY*, but lacking the erudition of Dr. Murray's book and the perfect logical orderliness of Msgr. Haas's now, unfortunately, out-of-date text. In other words, the text material is more elementary and could be, probably, more easily handled in freshman or sophomore college years than Father Murray's.

The teacher aids, "selected projects" at the end of each section, would doubtless challenge the full powers of the teacher himself and require some extensive span of years for their completion. There is a glossary, for this science has indeed an esoteric vocabulary, as Hughes demands. There is also an extensive list of questions relevant to the material in each of the chapters and a Bibliography of Required and Suggested Readings. Essentially, this is an analysis of social processes by Catholic philosophers. Pictorial statistics enliven some of the pages.

The book has merits, but this reviewer takes emphatic exception to the definitions of "civilization" and "culture," viz: "Civilization is essentially the prevalence of social peace . . .

enforced by a code of law and morals to which all may appeal to put a check on the violent impulses of passion and savagery. A certain minimum of culture, however, is presupposed before civilization can begin its work. There must, for instance, be enough mental culture to make the formulation of a code of law possible, enough moral culture to insure the observance of that code; and sufficient technical or industrial culture to enable man to provide for the necessities of life" (p. 176), and (p. 178) "Culture is an accessory to civilization and is concerned with the utilities and adornments of life."

This is simply not the sense in which either of these terms is used in Sociology. There must indeed be a human society to express a culture, and if there is a human society its social life is a culture, no matter how primitive. There is simply no such phenomenon, civilized, or uncivilized as a nation without a culture.

Is civilization, essentially, "the prevalence of social peace"? Doubtless its advance is aided by social peace. What happens to civilization in time of war?

"Implicit in the democratic system is the right to elect officials and replace them through the process of nomination and election."

One of the collaborators is a lawyer, according to the publisher's statement, from whom might be expected more care, or less liberty with the terminology of political science. "Nomination" and "Election" and all or any part thereof, are characteristic of *republicanism* which can be just as undemocratic and despotic as any unlimited monarchy. Some one has observed that "There is no tyranny like the tyranny of the majority." There is a redeeming, if illogical, observation on the following page (229), "Democracy is . . . the concept of a community in which the person finds proper expression through the community . . . for only in the Christian sense is the individual at once given his unique value and the community its proper expression as a brotherhood."

On page 326, "Nine great empires span the pagan age" and on page 351 the authors speak of "the five great empires that span the pagan age." This is not a serious error, of course, but it is indicative of "fine writing," and a lack of scientific objectivity. The book is open to all the objections voiced against Father Murray's book, in that it too includes much more than sociology proper, and in addition this text lacks the precision and objectivity of the Notre Dame product which, according to a study by Father Reidy of Indianapolis for the sociology department of The Catholic University, is the text used in the vast majority of Catholic colleges. This poll was made, however, previous to the publication of Dr. Eva J. Ross's new volume which may have replaced Father Murray's in some of our schools.

Without minimizing the many excellencies of this book, one is compelled to admit that the de-paganized, purely scientific, and therefore properly *Sociology* text is to be sought here in vain.

SISTER M. LIGUORI, B.V.M.

**Belgian Rural Cooperation. By Eva J. Ross, Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1940. 208 pp. \$4.50.**

*Belgian Rural Cooperation* is an excellent study in successful social adjustment under a democratic process of adult education in discussion groups. Under the leadership of religion, the rural Belgians acquainted themselves with their local problems and soon realized the need of social groupings, i. e., the need of cooperatives for production and consumption.

In this careful study of the Belgian advance, Dr. Ross points out how the admirable qualities of the people in rural Belgium, their qualities of hard work, perseverance, activity and intelligence, soon helped them to build strong cooperatives, i. e., democratic business groups that were to form the basis of a better social edifice for the Belgians and their families.

Intelligent association and discussion furnished solutions for difficult Belgian agricultural problems. Only rarely did the Belgians have recourse to the state and then only to obtain helpful legislation enabling them to carry out the objectives of their cooperative organizations. Under the leadership of their priests and with their cooperative associations, the people of rural Belgium in the short space of twenty years stepped up the ladder of social progress, enlarged their horizons, and opened up for themselves new possibilities. Where before the people had been generally ignorant and neglectful of economic conditions in agriculture, in their cooperative groups they soon read and discussed agricultural publications, attended lectures and were glad to hear about and try new experiments which gave promise of better production on the small farm.

Notwithstanding an excellent cooperative development and a fine social awakening, the Belgian agriculturist tended to make some serious agricultural mistakes — the mistakes of over-specialization, over-industrialization, and the practice of too much commercialism. These mistakes, of course, are not inherent in the very nature and philosophy of cooperation. These mistakes were the result rather of a general worldwide spread of cheap commercialism and the blind acceptance of urban ways of insecurity. Throughout the world people centralized in insecure cities and even the agriculturist substituted factory living and thinking in place of home living and thinking. The story of Belgian Rural Cooperation proves that cooperative leaders, too, must learn that life on the land is not merely a factory process or an industrial process of buying and selling in a very unfair system of exchange, but that life on the land should first of all be a way to security — the general security which comes through the diversified production of food and feed crops for the farm family and the livestock on the farm. The domestic economy, the home production of the year-round food supply, is always the most modern, the most scientific, the most secure, the most efficient thing to do on the land. This is a land fact, an agricultural principle, that all of us, including those who have advanced in cooperation, may easily ignore in these days of mad specialization and confused marketing and buying of food, clothing and shelter. We are glad that Dr. Ross points out the factory mistakes, the urban mistakes which came into Belgian agriculture along with the development of cooperation itself. These mistakes are not the work of cooperative philosophy and organization. They are the mistakes of factory-minded people. They are the mistakes of people who do not understand the economic soundness of food production in the homes, the mistakes of people who put foods on the production lines and on the distribution lines, because automobiles airplanes, etc., are handled that way.

The Belgian cooperatives, and this is true of many cooperatives, were guilty at times of abandoning their true cooperative principles. In so far as these principles of mutual service and the distribution of savings according to service are abandoned, the old evils of capitalistic

control by the few and profit-taking by the few reappear. When the cooperatives grow too large the members lose their control. These defects, as well as the defect of an agriculture too industrialized, could easily have been remedied by the Belgian cooperators. They had in the past solved problems far greater than these, and the far-reaching social good extending itself in so many directions is clearly seen in Dr. Ross's scholarly appraisal of Belgian Cooperation. In the chapter on The Belgische Boerenbond, Dr. Ross points out the sound philosophy which motivates the many social and economic activities of this cooperative institution. Its activities center around the notion that the family is the most important social and economic unit. These activities have made the Belgian ruralist modern in the best sense of that word and he has been able to preserve a full and unified social life, maintaining the family as a harmonious social and economic unit.

JOHN C. RAWE

**Primer of the Principles of Social Science.** By Rt. Rev. Mgr. Michael Cronin. Dublin. M. H. Gill & Son, Ltd., second edition (revised), 1934. 124 pp. 2/3.

In this small volume, the author of *The Science of Ethics* presents a brief introduction to some contemporary questions of social ethics. Presenting the material in the question and answer form, the work is intended for high school students. Specifically, the questions discussed are: society, ownership and private property, production of wealth and division of wealth. In a brief, compact way, these questions are presented in an intelligible manner and a high school student should not experience any difficulty in following the author's explanations.

This book would be helpful for study clubs, discussion groups, and any individuals interested in a brief, concise treatment of these problems.

VINCENT A. MCQUADE

**The Framework of a Christian State.** By Rev. E. Cahill, S.J., Dublin, M. H. Gill & Son, Ltd., 1932. 701 pp. 15-.

Modern international conditions make a book of this kind interesting reading. The main thesis of the book is, "to summarize and present in a consecutive and more or less scientific form the main elements of the teachings of the Roman Pontiffs (especially Leo XIII and our present Holy Father Pius XI), the Catholic Bishops and the standard Catholic authors on questions connected with social organization and public life."

After a sketchy historical outline, the author describes the foundations of the modern state. A treatment of individual rights and duties followed by a consideration of the fundamental Christian principles

which should be the guiding norms for the modern state are then presented. Readers searching for a careful and detailed consideration of the great problems agitating modern nations, questions of militarism, conscription, neutrality, blockade, etc., will not find them treated here except in a most general manner.

The book is a storehouse of information and students of social science will find it a valuable addition to their libraries.

VINCENT A. MCQUADE

**A Key to Sources on Christian Social Reconstruction by Joseph F. MacDonnell and Joseph F. Quane, S.J., published by the Knights of Columbus, 1939, 47 pp.**

This is an excellent handbook of general references and source material for study groups and elementary courses in Christian Social Reconstruction. It also has a well-rounded bibliography on contemporary social movements.

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
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